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PeruWe present results from an artefactual ﬁeld experiment conducted in rural Peru that considers whether ob-
serving non-reciprocal behavior inﬂuences an individual's decision to reciprocate. Speciﬁcally, we consider
the behavior of second movers in a trust game, assessing whether their decision to reciprocate is inﬂuenced
by the observed reciprocity of others. In documenting the impact of an external shock to observed reciprocity,
this paper shows that small increases in non-reciprocal behavior result in an unraveling of the norm of rec-
iprocity. Survey data is used to explore mechanisms by which this occurred. Results are not consistent with
learning effects, suggesting that preferences may be changed by observing others deviating from a norm of
reciprocity. These results suggest that investing in encouraging trustworthy behavior can have large beneﬁts
in situations where individuals are observing each other's behavior, such as may be the case in a new market
institution.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
Social norms play a central role in guiding economic behaviour,
perhaps none more so than norms of trust and reciprocity. As Arrow
(1972) states: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within
itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a
period of time. It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic
backwardness in the world can be explained by lack of mutual conﬁ-
dence." Indeed it is true that norms of trust and reciprocity are not
equally present in all contexts (Bohnet and Baytelman, 2007; Bowles
et al., 2004), and the story of economic development is one in which
these norms change over time (for example, see the story of develop-
ment undermining the norm of reciprocity in the !Kung in Kranton
(1996) and Yellen (1990)). A question of primary importance thus be-
comes, howdo norms of trust and reciprocity strengthen and unravel?
The process of norm development is undoubtedly complex, the re-
sult of “historical accident and the accumulation of precedent”
(Young, 2008). One observation that is frequently made is that in cer-
tain contexts, deviations from a pre-existing normby a few individ-
uals can engender quite widespread social change. This observation
is central to Granovetter's model of threshold effects and rioting be-
havior (Granovetter, 1979), Young's theoretical work on how small
variations in behavior at the individual level can trigger major norm
shifts at the societal level (Young, 1998), Glaeser et al.'s analysis of+1 202 467 4439.
uyama@cgiar.org
-ND license. the heterogeneity in crime rates across time and space (Glaeser et
al., 1996), and Gladwell's best-seller, “The Tipping Point" (Gladwell,
2002). The central tenet of these observations is that we are more
likely to permit ourselves to engage in deviant behaviour when we
see others engaging in deviant acts. In this context, “deviant” refers
to going against the norm and does not necessarily have a negative
outcome. In fact, deviance brings about positive social change when
existing norms are oppressive (consider Rosa Parks) or inefﬁcient.
One well-discussed example of this phenomena is petty crime.
Glaeser et al. show that the variance of crime rates across space and
their rapid growth and reduction across time are consistent with a
model in which the probability that an individual undertakes a
crime is positively inﬂuenced by the number of people around him
also engaging in criminal behaviour (Glaeser et al., 1996). Speciﬁcally,
they show that variation in crime rates in the US is higher than that
which can be explained bydemographic transition and that social in-
teractions in crime rates are present for minor crimes. Criminology's
broken window theory would be one possible explanation for the so-
cial interaction effect that Glaeser et al. ﬁnd. In this theory, individuals
are more likely to commit small crimes in an environment in which it
is clear that other small crimes have been committed. As such, one or
two small crimes can cause general disorder to spread. Evidence for
this causal relationship is presented in Keizer et al. (2008). They ran-
domly varied the presence of littering, grafﬁti and evidence of proper-
ty rights violations in six different settings in a Dutch city and tested
whether this exogenous increase in observed norm violations in-
duced people to violate norms of littering, trespassing and stealing.
In each setting, they found that it did: individuals were more likely
to litter, trespass and steal when they observed evidence that others
had not behaved appropriately.
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changes in norms of trust and reciprocity over time. Just as trust
and trustworthiness can be built, they can also be undermined. This
paper endeavors to provide some insight into how a norm of reci-
procity (and mutual cooperation) can unravel when individuals are
observing each other's behavior. This paper uses a twice-repeated
trust game conducted in rural Peru to assess whether an individual's
decision to reciprocate is inﬂuenced by the observed reciprocity of
others. This relationship has, to the authors' knowledge, not been ex-
amined in the context of a trust game before nor using a careful iden-
tiﬁcation strategy for what is observed in a group setting. We ﬁnd
that reciprocity decreases when small increases in non-reciprocal be-
havior are observed, but that this effect only exists when there is no
strategic reason to cooperate.
Observing a positive relationship between an individual's actions
and the actions of his peers does not, however, imply a causal rela-
tionship. As Manski (2000) argues, a positive relationship could also
be explained by the inﬂuence of observed characteristics on behavior
(given characteristics are likely to determine behavior) or the inﬂu-
ence of correlated effects such as shared individual and environmen-
tal characteristics.
In order to determine whether the relationship we observe is
causal, we induced exogenous variation in observed behaviour and
used this exogenous variation to identify a causal effect. Speciﬁcally,
we introduced an information shock to randomly selected ﬁrst
movers in a trust game. This information shock reduced trust on the
part of ﬁrst movers which translated into reduced reciprocity ob-
served by randomly selected second movers. We use this information
shock to identify the impact of observed reciprocity on an individual's
decision to reciprocate trust.1 We ﬁnd that once instrumented, ob-
served reciprocity still remains a signiﬁcant determinant of reciprocal
behavior.
There are a number of reasons why the deviant behavior of one in-
dividual may impact the behavior of others. The economics literature
typically delineates three channels by which the actions of others in-
ﬂuence an individual's behavior (Becker and Murphy, 2000;
Bernheim, 1994).2 The most basic is that of externalities: actions
taken by others may increase (or decrease) returns that an individual
receives from undertaking the same action (such as in the case of con-
tributing to a public good). The second mechanism is informational:
to the extent that an individual believes others are better informed
about the optimal course of action, the behavior of others may pro-
vide a source of information regarding the course of action she should
take (e.g. Chamley, 2004, and the references within). Thirdly, social
interactions can inﬂuence an individual's preferences if individuals
derive utility from minimizing the extent to which their actions devi-
ate from the average behavior of others (Akerlof, 1997; Bernheim,
1994; Jones, 1984; Lindbeck et al., 1999).
Using data that was collected in a survey of participants, we try to
understand the mechanisms that caused observed behavior to inﬂu-
ence the actions that an individual takes. The experimental design
was such that there were no externalities in returns and so we
focus on testing for information or learning effects and for changes
in preferences. Our results are not consistent with the presence of
learning effects (perhaps not surprising, given the nature of the
game) but are consistent with a story in which preferences are chan-
ged by observing others deviating from a norm of reciprocity.
Our ﬁndings have implications for the development of markets
that require higher levels of trustworthy behavior, such as credit1 This approach is comparable to Casari et al. (2007), who use their experimental de-
sign to create instruments that can be used to identify typical selection effects in com-
mon value experiments.
2 The tendency for individuals to behave as others do has been well documented in
the psychological literature (Asch, 1951, 1955; Helson et al., 1958; Rosenbaum, 1956;
Rosenbaum and Blake, 1955).markets. The unraveling of reciprocity that we document is one pos-
sible mechanism behind the results of Feigenberg et al. (2010). Fei-
genberg et al build on the work of Putnam (1993) and many others
by showing that institutionalizing norms of frequent information
sharing and monitoring can increase cooperation, impacting the qual-
ity of credit market access that develops. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that
exogenous assignment of an individual to an institution that reduces
the level of loan repayment not only increases contemporaneous de-
fault rates, but also induces lower reciprocal behavior in a public
goods game conducted 1 year later. There are a number of potential
explanations for such ﬁndings. One explanation is the salience of
the observed behavior of others in individual decision-making: the
more default observed by an individual in credit market interactions,
the more likely it is that individuals will, in turn, choose not to behave
reciprocally.
The experiment was conducted in rural Peru, a setting in which
the importance of trust in facilitating market development has been
well documented. For example, studies conducted in rural (Karlan,
2007) and urban (Ambrus et al., 2008; Karlan et al., 2009a) settings
in Peru have focused on how trust, through informal social networks,
has made group lending schemes feasible by facilitating the monitor-
ing and enforcement of joint liability loan contracts. Trustworthiness,
as measured by the standard trust game, was found to be an impor-
tant predictor for the success of group lending programs in rural
areas and informal borrowing schemes in urban shantytowns,
where loan repayment is enforced mainly through social pressure
(Karlan, 2005; Karlan et al., 2009b).3 Understanding how trustwor-
thiness can strengthen or unravel is thus vital in thiscontext.
In the following sections, we detail the experimental design
(Section 2), describe the study location and implementation
(Section 3), and present empirical results (Section 4). Section 5
concludes.2. Experimental design
Our experimental design has three key features. We study behav-
ior in an artefactual environment using a twice-repeated trust game.
This is a game that has been used extensively to study normative be-
havior such as trust and reciprocity (Berg et al., 1995). Second, given
that we are concerned with the second mover's decision to recipro-
cate or not, in the presence of what is observed at the group level,
we build “peer observability” into the design of the experiment. Final-
ly, we use exogenously induced changes to identify the impact of ob-
served behavior on individual decision-making (Manski, 2000).
Below we discuss the different components of our experimental de-
sign and how they enable us to study our main question.2.1. The twice repeated trust game
Each subject participated in a twice-repeated standard trust game.
The extensive form of the game is presented in Fig. 1. Each period
entailed the following. At the beginning of the period, both the ﬁrst
mover (player A) and the second mover (player B) were given an en-
dowment equal to x. The ﬁrst mover had to choose between keeping x
(a move denoted by E for “exit”) or sending x to player B (a move
denoted by T for “trust”). If player A chose E, the period ended and
both players earned x. If player A chose T, then player B would receive
3x in addition to the initial endowment x. At this point, player B had
to choose between keeping all 4x and leaving player A with 0 (a3 Other studies have also used artefactual ﬁeld experiments to better understand the
links between behavior and market outcomes in Peru, such as the effect of risk aversion
on group lending (Giné et al., 2009) and on entrepreneurship (Castillo et al., 2010), the
effect of ambiguity aversion on farm decisions (Engle-Warnick et al., 2008), and the
behavioral effects of index insurance on cotton farmers (Carter et al., 2008).
Fig. 1. Extensive form of twice-repeated trust game.
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ing 2x (a move denoted by R for “reciprocate”).
More formally, we can consider Player A's per-period expected
utility as
EUAt ¼ x ð1Þ
if she chooses Et, and
EUAt ¼ pt2x ð2Þ
if she chooses Tt, where pt is the probability with which player A be-
lieves that player B will reciprocate. Player A thus chooses Tt whenev-
er pt>1/2. The key feature of player A's behavior for our purposes is
that player A's decision to “trust” depends on pt. Were there to be
an exogenous reduction in pt, player A would be less likely to send.
As the main interest in this paper is player B's behavior, we com-
plicate the exposition with regard to the second mover's preferences,
along the lines of the Cox et al. (2007) model of reciprocity which al-
lows reciprocity to depend on an emotional state.4 We characterize
player B's utility as depending on her own monetary payoff and the
monetary payoff player A receives. Player B's per-period expected
utility is thus:
EUBt ¼ xBt þ θtxAt ; ð3Þ
where xtB is the amount player B receives, xtA is the amount player A
receives, and θt is an emotional state and determines the degree to
which player B derives utility from the payoff that player A receives.
Player B will choose Rt whenever
2xþ θt2x≥4x; ð4Þ
i.e. whenever θt≥1. We can thus think of pt as player A's belief that
θt≥1 for the player B with whom she is partnered.
Whilst this accurately characterizes behavior in the second stage
of the twice-repeated trust game, we note that player B has an addi-
tional, strategic, motive for reciprocating trust in the ﬁrst stage. By
choosing Rt in the ﬁrst stage player B may induce player A to believe
that her emotional state is such that θt≥1 thereby inducing trust in
the ﬁrst stage and allowing her to choose Dt in the second round.
2.2. Peer observability and player preferences
To study the effect of group behavior on individual behavior, we
departed from the typical experiment setup in which subjects are
separated from peers. While we still separated player As from player
Bs by randomly assigning the role of player A and player B to different4 It would be quite possible for player As preference to reﬂect a degree of other-
regardingness and also betrayal-aversion; a number of studies have shown that this
may well be appropriate, but this is not the focus of this paper.communities, we allowed player As to observe the choices of other As
and player Bs to observe the choices of other Bs.
Thus in one session there were N player As and N player Bs. Each
player A was matched to one player B, forming a pair j. Each pair j
played the twice-repeated trust game surrounded by N-1 other
players of her type. The anonymity between player types can be
thought to correspond to social distance between types, whilst the
ability of individuals to observe players of their own type can be
thought to correspond to social proximity among individuals of the
same type. This set-up can be seen as corresponding to a situation
in which farmers within a village have entered contractual agree-
ments with traders or lenders from a nearby market town.
Each player was able to observe the actions of the other players of
her type. While subjects were instructed not to interact with each
other, our experiment protocol did allow for visual observation of
one's peers. This was promoted by using white envelopes for “keep-
ing” (Et or Dt) and yellow envelopes for “sending” (Tt or Rt). We
chose this form of peer observability since we found it to be quite nat-
ural for the subject pool under consideration. To exploit within-
session heterogeneity in peer observability using individual speciﬁc
measures of what was observed, we randomly assigned seating at
the beginning of the experiment session and held it ﬁxed throughout.
We can identify two potential effects of this observability on play-
er B behavior. Observing others taking action Rt (Dt) may encourage
player B to also take action Rt (Dt). Second, the fact that player B is ob-
served by others may impact the decisions she decides to take. For ex-
ample, observation by others may induce shame were an individual
to choose Dt over Rt (Tadelis, 2008). To reﬂect this in the decision
player B faces, we model player B's preference for reciprocity, thetat,
as depending on an innate preference for reciprocity denoted as α,
and social effects (M1t,M2t), such that
θt ¼ f α;M1t ;M2tð Þ; ð5Þ
where,M1t is the degree to which other player Bs are observed not to
reciprocate and M2t is the degree to which other player Bs observe
player B. In a model of positive social interactions, we would expect
δθ
δM1t
b0, and in a model of shame, δθδM2t > 0.
2.3. Information shocks
To identify the effect onM1t on behavior, we used our experimen-
tal design to create an instrument in the following way. We con-
ducted two types of sessions: sessions in which we played the trust
game just described (TG) and sessions in which we played the mod-
iﬁed trust game (MTG). The MTG was identical to the TG with the ex-
ception that player As received additional information. First, based on
a baseline TG session conducted some days prior, all player As in the
MTG were informed that in a previous session, almost half of player
Bs chose not to reciprocate. We call this “public information".
Fig. 2. Semi-concentric circles measure of observability from player 15's point of view.
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(DG) a week prior to participation in the experiment. This game was
conducted to measure an individual's innate tendency to behave in a
trustworthy manner. Bohnet and Baytelman (2007) use the same
procedure to measure the social orientation of subjects, citing work
conducted in earlier studies (such as by Ashraf et al., 2006) which
documents how measures of social orientation from dictator games
are correlated with an individual's trustworthiness in a trust game.
In the DG, the subject played the role of dictator and had to decide
whether or not to divide four Peruvian soles equally between herself
and another person. If she chose to do so, she and her partner in the
main treatment would earn an additionaltwo soles at the end of the
study. If not, she would earn an additional four soles and her partner
would earn no additional soles. It was made clear to the subject that
her choice in the DGwould not be taken into account when determin-
ing whether or not she would be selected for the main treatment.
Player As in the MTG who were paired with a player B who chose
to keep all 4 soles in the DG were informed of their partner's decision.
We call this “personal information".5
The information provided can be considered a shock to pt, in most
cases comprising a negative shock to pt as a result of the second type
of information provided. By reducing expected trustworthiness and
increasing the probability of betrayal we expect that the provision
of information will reduce trust (Ashraf et al., 2006; Bohnet and
Zeckhauser, 2004). As such, we would expect the proportion of player
As choosing Tt in the MTG to be lower than the proportion of player
As choosing Tt in the TG. This in turn implies that lower reciprocation
is observed by player Bs, as only those households that were trusted
can be observed to reciprocate. And thus M1it increases.
We construct three measures of M1it based on varying the deﬁni-
tion of what was observed. First we assume that player B sees every-
one in the same row and the rows in front. We then construct a more
ﬂexible variable to capture the impact of the players' ability to see
other players' actions. As before, for a given player, the players not
seen are those sitting in the rows behind that player. However, we
no longer assume that the player is able to observe the actions of ev-
erybody else in her row and in the rows in front of her, at least not to
the same degree. Building concentric semi-circles around the player,
we assume that she observes the actions of other players in each
semi-circle with increasing difﬁculty. Evidently, the further away
the other player is, the harder it will be to observe her actions.
The logic behind the concentric semi-circles measure is better un-
derstood by looking at Fig. 2. From player 15's point of view, all the
players in the back row (17 to 20) are in her blind spot. Players 10,
11, 12, 14, and 15 are immediately next to her and therefore are the
most observable to her. Players in the second row (5 to 8) and also
players 9 and 13 have one player in between player 15 and them-
selves, so we can assume their actions are slightly more hidden.
Players in the front row (1 to 4) are two players away from player
15 and hence even harder to observe.
Using this conceptualization, we build two additional measures of
observability by giving different weights to the players seen depend-
ing on the concentric semi-circles to which they belong.6
• First semi-circle only: This counts those in the ﬁrst semi-circle by
giving those players a weight of 1 and players in all other semi-
circles a weight of 0.
• Decreasing semi-circles: This counts those in the ﬁrst semi-circle by
giving those players a weight of 1 and players in all other semi-
circles a weight of 0.25.5 While we revealed the partner's choice, we did not reveal her identity. Revealing
this information was thus not inconsistent with the DG protocol, which assured subject
anonymity and privacy of decision-making toward the enumerator.
6 Notice that our ﬁrst measure – counting everyone in the same row and in front – is
just a special case of the concentric semi-circles measure where all the semi-circles
have the same weight.For each measure of M1it, we construct a corresponding measure
of information, Iit. Ii counts, among those observed, the proportion
of partners that received information. We count the number of part-
ners that received personal information and weight them according
to each one of the three deﬁnitions of observability used in construct-
ing M1it. In each case, this information measure is used as our instru-
ment. We are thus exploiting the random allocation of personal
information within and between sessions to create an instrument
for what is observed.
2.4. Hypotheses and empirical tests
Based on the discussion in the previous subsection, we summarize
our main hypotheses and the corresponding empirical testing strategy:
Hypothesis 1. The observed behavior of others has an impact on behav-
ior. In particular, when observed sending is lower, player B is less likely to
send: δθδM1it b0:
Hypothesis 2. Being observed also affects behavior. In particular, people
who are observed less will be less likely to send: δθδM2it > 0:
We identify the relationship between an individual's action and
M1t by taking advantage of the fact that information introduces exog-
enous variation in the prevalence of observed reciprocative behavior.
Random seating introduces within-session variation in the informa-
tion to hand and also introduces within-session variation in the de-
gree to which individuals are observed, which we use to identify
the relationship between an individual's choices and M2it.
The system of regressions we run for player B in each round are:
Dit ¼ β0 þ βM1M1it þ βM2M2it þ εit ð6Þ
M1it ¼ α0 þ αI Ii þ ηit ; ð7Þ
where Dit is a dummy indicating whether individual i chose action D
in round t and Ii is as described above. Coefﬁcients βM1 and βM2 test
whether individual behavior is affected by the observed behavior of
others and by being observed, respectively. We would expect
βM1>0, and βM2b0.
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through which observing more defection at the group level would in-
crease the likelihood that player B defects: pecuniary externalities, in-
formation, or changing preferences. We rule out one of these in the
experimental design (pecuniary beneﬁts to higher group cooperation),
but social learning (either about the artefactual game theywere playing
or about the norm of reciprocity) and changing preferences remain as
possible explanations. If social learning is present, we would expect
that observing the behavior of others would have a particularly strong
effect for those who were less sure of how to play or for those who
had understood the game less well. If observations of group behavior
affect preferences, this will not be the case. Rather, we may observeFig. 3. Huaral communitiedifferential effects for those with initially different preferences. We
thus develop the following two sub-hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. If the observed behavior of others has an impact pri-
marily as a result of learning or imitation effect, the impact of observed
behavior will be higher for those who were less likely to understand
the game or were less sure of how to play.
Hypothesis 1b. If the observed behavior of others has an impact
through changing preferences, such as legitimizing non-reciprocal be-
havior, the impact of (non-reciprocal) observed behavior may be higher
for those who previously reported that they would reciprocate.s in the intervention.
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We conducted 8 sessions with 308 randomly selected individuals
from 8 rural communities surrounding the city of Huaral, 75 km
north of Lima (see Fig. 3).7 Each session comprised a group of about
18 player As and a group of about 18 player Bs located in separate
communities. The TG was conducted in ﬁve sessions and the MTG
was conducted in three sessions.
Situated in the valley of the Chancay river, the Huaral area is one
of Lima's main providers of fresh produce, poultry and pork, which
is why it is known as “Lima's pantry.” Not surprisingly, the main
income-generating activity for most of the households in Huaral is
market-oriented agriculture. In spite of this, the majority of land par-
cels are small and poverty is still highly prevalent in the area.
The eight communities selected for the intervention were chosen
based on: (i) classiﬁcation as rural by Peru's National Statistics Bureau
(INEI) and (ii) size. Selected communities had at least 100 house-
holds.8 Player A and player B sessions were conducted simultaneous-
ly in separate communities in order to guarantee that participants
knew as little as possible about the person with whom they had
been paired.
3.1. Listing and the dictator game
A listing exercise was conducted in each community in the
10 days prior to the experimental sessions. This served to inform
the participants about the experimental sessions and provided a sam-
pling frame from which to select the participants. It also provided an
opportunity to conduct the DG. To ease implementation, only those
who had undertaken some schooling were allowed to participate in
the game. No other restrictions on participation were imposed.
The procedures used for the DG were primarily intended to assure
anonymity of subject decision-making. While some studies suggest
audience effects are minimal (for example Laury et al. (1995)),
other work has found these to be signiﬁcant (e.g., Hoffman et al.,
1996). Bohnet and Frey (1999) also ﬁnd that choices are altered as
a result of an “identiﬁable victim" effect when the dictator knows or
faces her partner (comparable to Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009).
Since the DG was conducted by enumerators (who were trained col-
lectively by one of the experimenters), the following procedure was
maintained to mitigate such effects. The decision (i.e. whether to di-
vide equally or not), the procedure for recording the decision (dis-
cussed below), and the consequence of the decision for earnings
(i.e., an additional 2 or 4 soles depending on her choice, to be paid
the day of the main experiment) were explained to the subject. The
procedure for recording the decision was as follows. Once the enu-
merator explained the DG and answered any questions, he gave the
subject a paper with the two options and an envelope. The enumera-
tor then separated himself from the subject. The subject circled her
option, folded the paper, put it in the envelope, sealed the envelope,
and handed it back to the enumerator. The enumerator then codiﬁed
the envelope with a unique household ID assigned by the experi-
menters. DG subjects had no information about their partners.
Separating the person obtaining the response from the person
making the payment meant a delay between play and pay.9 A reason-
able concern associated with this approach is that the delayed pay-
ment introduces noise to the data since subjects are less likely to
believe that they will be paid.10 To the extent that subjects doubted
that they would be paid, their behavior would approximate behavior7 Prior to these sessions, one pilot session was conducted in the same communities
for smaller stakes (x=1). These data are not used in the analysis.
8 The communities were San Jose, Cuyo, Huayan, Esperanza, La Huaca, La Caporala,
Retes, and Miraﬂores.
9 The type of separation of play and pay has been used in risk experiments (Dohmen
et al., 2011) but not to our knowledge in DG protocols.
10 None of the enumerators reported concerns from subjects in this regard.in a hypothetical DG as opposed to a real-stakes DG. Previous litera-
ture (for example, Ben-Ner and Levy (2008)) suggests that responses
elicited in a hypothetical DG protocol are, on average, no different
from responses elicited in a real-stakes DG. As such, we might expect
behavior in our DG protocol to be similar to a protocol in which play
and pay were not separated.
Although separating the person who obtained the response (the
enumerator) from the person who paid for it (the assistant experi-
menter) mitigated audience effects in an attempt to approximate
double blind protocols in laboratory experiments, it does not
completely eliminate them. To truly complete a double blind experi-
ment, we would have asked subjects to complete their response
sheet and to pick up their payment from private mailboxes or a differ-
ent person in a different room as has been done previously in DG
experiments. As such, it would be wrong to interpret the DG results
as behavior in the second stage of a TG absent audience effects.
It may also be the case that individuals perceived that they were
playing a different game altogether, such as a trust game with the
experimenter.11
We are therefore cautious about how we use these results. There
are two important factors in the way these results are used: (i) that
player As who received information about their partner's DG play
used this information to update pt and (ii) that the DG game captured
some measure of reciprocity when the behavior of others was not ob-
served. Our empirical results are consistent with this interpretation.
3.2. Experimental sessions
Each experimental session consisted of the following components.
On average two hours before the experiment session started, enu-
merators located selected participants within their respective com-
munities to inform them of the exact time and location of the study.
Subjects were instructed to bring picture identiﬁcation.
Upon arrival, subjects presented their picture ID and signed in.
They then drew a number out of a bag, which was recorded on the
sign-in sheet. This number randomly determined their seat and part-
ner throughout the experiment session.
The layout of the sessions was typically the same as indicated in
Fig. 2. The experimenter was located at the front of the room, with
three to ﬁve rows of four subjects spread across the room and the as-
sistant experimenter in an adjacent room or hallway. Once all sub-
jects were seated, the explanation began. Since some subjects were
expected to have difﬁculty reading, all subjects were instructed
orally.12
Subjects were informed that they were players A or B, that they
would be playing a game twice with someone in another community
of Huaral, and that they would not learn the identity of this person
and vice versa. The moves and earnings were explained to the sub-
jects. Fig. 4 was used to help explain this. Subjects were quizzed on
their understanding of the game and the process. This served as an in-
dication of issues that needed clariﬁcation prior to the game.
Subjects were given two envelopes: one white and one yellow.
The white envelope was to be used to “keep” vouchers (E or D) and
the yellow envelope was to be used to “send” vouchers (T or R).
Player As revealed their preferences by either placing the voucher
in the yellow envelope or not. Experimenter A collected all yellow en-
velopes in order and delivered them to assistant experimenter A. As-
sistant experimenter A registered the decisions and called assistant
experimenter B to transfer the decisions.
Assistant experimenter B registered the decisions, placed the cor-
responding number of vouchers (either three or zero) in yellow enve-
lopes, and delivered them in order to experimenter B. Experimenter B
handed out the yellow envelopes, instructed player Bs to check the11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
12 The exact text for the instructions can be obtained from the authors upon request.
Fig. 4. Graphical explanation of the game.
Table 1
Comparison between participants and eligible non-participants (Player B).
Eligible non-part. Part. Diff.
Age of household head 46.194 49.020 −2.825
(0.864) (2.450) (2.348)
Age of spouse 39.566 41.000 −1.434
(0.571) (1.397) (1.578)
Schooling of household head (years) 8.537 8.824 −0.287
(0.192) (0.395) (0.500)
Schooling of spouse (years) 7.633 8.235 −0.601
(0.149) (0.291) (0.403)
Fraction of households in agriculturea 0.629 0.660 −0.032
(0.021) (0.046) (0.051)
Land (has.) 1.653 1.443 0.210
(0.141) (0.332) (0.339)
Amount kept in dictator game (soles)b 2.537 2.472 0.065
(0.039) (0.083) (0.094)
Observations 548 106
Source is listing data.
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ing to the contents of the yellow envelope. In particular, those player
Bs who were sent vouchers had a choice to make.
Player Bs revealed their preferences by either putting two
vouchers in the yellow envelopes or not. Those player Bs who were
not sent vouchers had no decision to make and placed their one
voucher in the white envelope. Experimenter B collected the yellow
envelopes in order and handed them to assistant experimenter B. As-
sistant experimenter B registered the decisions and called assistant
experimenter A, who registered the decisions and placed the number
of vouchers in the yellow envelopes. Experimenter A handed out the
yellow envelopes and instructed player As to review the contents of
their yellow envelopes. Any remaining vouchers at the end of the pe-
riod would go into the white envelope. This process was repeated
twice.
In order to maintain consistency, both experimenters maintained
the same script. These scripts were identical across player A and B
sessions, with the exception of the MTG sessions in which additional
information was given to player As. In these sessions, the information
on the proportion of player Bs that had reciprocated in the baseline
session was publicly announced to all player As. Personal information
was given to selected player As individually outside of the room.
A session lasted on average two and one half hours. Upon comple-
tion of the session, subjects were paid in private for their (i) session
earnings, (ii) show-up earnings (1 sol), (iii) survey earnings (1 sol),
and (iv) DG earnings (2, 4, or 6 soles). Average earnings were 34.08
soles (standard deviation: 16.88). This represents more than 6 per-
cent of the local monthly minimum wage for our subject pool.13
After each session, all subjects participated in a short household
survey that was conducted by the enumerators.13 Our sessions varied stakes x within the set {5 soles, 10 soles}.4. Data and results
We ﬁrst present results to show that individuals in the role of
player B were randomly selected from the study population. We use
data collected during the listing exercise to compare the characteris-
tics of participants with eligible non-participants (those with some
schooling). Table 1 presents results comparing the characteristics col-
lected during listing – namely age, education, occupation, land own-
ership, and the dictator game response – for those who did and did
not participate. Participants and eligible non-participants were not
signiﬁcantly different along any of these dimensions. When weStandard errors in parentheses.
aAt least one household member works in agriculture.
bOptions for dictator game were: keep 4 soles and leave nothing, or keep 2 soles and
leave 2 soles.
157R.V. Hill et al. / Journal of Development Economics 99 (2012) 150–162compare all non-participants (both eligible and ineligible) with par-
ticipants, we observe that the years of education of the adult female
in the household is on average 1.3 years higher among participants.
This is because the minimum education criteria was binding for
some women in our study area. The women in our study are thus
more highly educated than the average in the study area.
Secondly, we check whether our randomization of information
treatment (Ii) worked. There were two steps to randomizing informa-
tion. As described in Section 3, player Bs were randomized into ses-
sion types (TG and MTG) and given random seating assignments.
We have three measures for Ii based on how we deﬁne what an indi-
vidual observed:
1. Same row and in front: The proportion of partners of peers in the
same row and in front who received individual information.
2. First semi-circle: The proportion of partners of peers in the ﬁrst
semi-circle who received information.
3. Decreasing semi-circles: The weighted proportion of partners of
peers in each semi-circle who received information.
We compare basic characteristics for each of these three measures.
Given that these are continuous measures of Ii, we present results for
a regression of Ii on each characteristic to test whether the measures
of the information treatment are correlated with any of them. Results
are summarized in Table 2. There is a signiﬁcant relationship between
the ﬁrst measure (“same row and in front") and two player B charac-
teristics: player Bs with a higher Ii are more likely to live in a smaller
house and less likely to have lent money. In regressions in which theTable 2
Balance across groups for different measures of proximity (Player B).
Using the following deﬁnition of observability
Same row and in front
(proportion)
Coef. on Ii Constant
Female 0.513 0.547
(0.326) (0.051)
Age −16.109 44.254
(9.464) (1.468)
Schooling (years) −0.156 8.856
(1.547) (0.240)
Any children −0.268 0.945
(0.180) (0.028)
Household size 1.722 4.531
(1.228) (0.190)
Quechua mother −0.202 0.304
(0.302) (0.047)
Father's schooling (years) −0.073 4.726
(2.290) (0.355)
Catholic −0.329 0.901
(0.222) (0.035)
Rooms in house −2.226 4.046
(1.119) (0.174)
Land (has.) −1.354 0.917
(1.438) (0.223)
Incomeb −2.298 2.029
(1.498) (0.232)
Ever paid in advance −0.228 0.135
(0.213) (0.033)
Ever been paid in adv. −0.389 0.135
(0.063) (0.032)
Lent money often −0.655 0.432
(0.320) (0.050)
Sent in dictator gamec −0.018 0.789
(0.335) (0.050)
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses.
aVisibility (inﬂuence) of participants not immediately around a player is reduced by a facto
bAnnual household income per capita, in thousands of Soles.
cDictator game results were available for only 94 of the subjects that participated as Player“same row and in front” measure is used, we include these two vari-
ables as controls. For the second and thirdmeasure (“ﬁrst semi-circle”
and “decreasing semi-circles”), there are no characteristics that are
signiﬁcantly different at the 5 percent level.
We now turn to the game results. We show three game trees indi-
cating how the 140 pairs of participants are distributed along the de-
cision process. The ﬁrst tree depicts the full results (Fig. 5), the second
depicts results for players in TG sessions (Fig. 6), and the third for
those in MTG sessions (Fig. 7). The latter group includes some indi-
viduals who were observing peers partnered with those given infor-
mation. Only slightly more (26 percent) player Bs chose to keep the
money in round 1 than in the DG; however, a much higher propor-
tion, 36 percent, chose to keep the money in round 2. The game
tree suggests that in the MTG sessions there was a difference in
both player A and B behavior: fewer player As sent and, conditional
on being sent, fewer player Bs reciprocated in the the second and
ﬁnal round. As these were the sessions in which Ii had some probabil-
ity of being non-zero, it is these differences that we seek to explain in
the following analysis.
4.1. Information and Player A behavior
We begin by assessing the impact of information on player A be-
havior. We would expect that being provided with the information
that one has been partnered with an untrustworthy type would dis-
courage one from sending; the game tree also seems to suggest this
is the case (Figs. 6 and 7). We test this in Table 3, which presentsFirst semi-circle Decreasing semi-circlesa
(proportion) (proportion)
Coef. on Ii Constant Coef. on Ii Constant
0.061 0.587 0.280 0.567
(0.222) (0.047) (0.293) (0.049)
−7.188 43.509 −12.935 43.988
(6.421) (1.356) (8.488) (1.428)
1.000 8.747 0.691 8.780
(1.040) (0.220) (1.383) (0.233)
−0.166 0.937 −0.247 0.943
(0.121) (0.026) (0.161) (0.027)
0.553 4.631 1.112 4.584
(0.833) (0.176) (1.103) (0.185)
−0.222 0.307 −0.279 0.311
(0.203) (0.043) (0.270) (0.045)
1.831 4.546 1.204 4.611
(1.537) (0.325) (2.047) (0.344)
−0.152 0.886 −0.283 0.897
(0.151) (0.032) (0.199) (0.034)
−1.028 3.946 −1.626 3.995
(0.761) (0.161) (1.007) (0.169)
−0.023 0.800 −0.379 0.893
(0.973) (0.206) (1.290) (0.217)
−1.180 1.937 −1.988 2.003
(1.014) (0.214) (1.342) (0.226)
−0.064 0.121 −0.145 0.128
(0.144) (0.030) (0.191) (0.032)
−0.187 0.118 −0.310 0.129
(0.135) (0.029) (0.179) (0.030)
−0.195 0.393 −0.446 0.414
(0.218) (0.046) (0.288) (0.048)
0.433 0.757 0.293 0.766
(0.244) (0.045) (0.321) (0.048)
140
r of 0.25.
B.
Fig. 5. Distribution of moves along twice-repeated trust game (all sessions).
Fig. 6. Distribution of moves along twice-repeated trust game (“No-info” sessions).
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sion. To control for the history of round 1 when assessing round 2 re-
sults, we include the history of play to this point. The key ﬁnding from
these tables is that introducing information reduces the probability
that player A will trust. This exogenously affects the environment in
which player Bs make their decisions (given that player B is unaware
that player A was provided with information), which is crucial for our
analysis.
Although information has strong effects in both rounds, the role of
information changes between rounds 1 and 2. In round 1, it is person-
al information that plays the largest role in determining behavior.
Public information has less of an impact on trusting behavior (public
information is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). In round 2, the pro-
vision of information has an impact at the group level, with those
who were provided personal information being no more likely to
exit than other player As in the roomwho were not provided with in-
formation. The results suggest that when player A observes more
non-reciprocal behavior of the partners of their fellow player As (as
is the case in the information treatments as shown below), they
may choose not to send.14 We also run regressions (1) and (3) using the proportion of other players not re-
ciprocating in the previous round instead of the concurrent round. The effect seems
to be immediate, as what happens in the room in the present round seems to explain
more of the variation in behavior than the behavior of others in previous rounds.4.2. Observability and Player B behavior
To analyze player B's decision to defect or reciprocate, we regress
the decision to defect on the same controls and additionally on the
proportion of other player Bs who were observed not reciprocating
(whether they were trusted or not) in each round. We use the pro-
portion of those in the “same row and in front" that did not recipro-
cate, as well as the two concentric semicircle measures. We now
know that these measures are in part driven by the information pro-
vided in player A's sessions. Linear Probability Model (LPM) results of
choices made in round 1 and 2 by player B are presented in Table 4.
Columns 1 and 4 present results when using the “same row and in
front" as a measure of observability. Columns 2 and 5 present results
using the ﬁrst semi-circle measure and columns 3 and 6 present re-
sults using the decreasing semi-circles measure.In round 1, the proportion observed not to reciprocate has no sig-
niﬁcant effect on player B behavior. However, in round 2, this propor-
tion does have a strong effect on behavior. The more players observed
not to reciprocate, the more probable it is thatplayer B will decide to
defect when having the choice.14 This is true however we deﬁne what
was observed. The insigniﬁcance of social inﬂuences in the ﬁrst
round, despite their signiﬁcance in the second, is consistent with
the hypothesis that strategic motives play a role in whether or not a
self-regarding individual reciprocates or defects at this stage. Given
that social inﬂuences do not appear to have much effect on round 1
behaviour (we ﬁnd this to be consistently the case for all measures
of observed behavior), we focus the rest of thediscussion on round
2 results.
However, given that we hypothesize the presence of interdepen-
dence between the choices of player Bs, we cannot assume that, for
a given player B, the proportion of other player Bs in the room who
chose to defect was not in turn caused by the behavior of that player
(what Manski (2000) refers to as the reﬂection problem). It is thus
necessary to instrument for the proportion of player Bs observed to
defect. We instrument using the corresponding measure of Ii for
each deﬁnition of observability. These results are presented in
Table 5. For two of the three measures used (“same row and in
front" and decreasing semi-circles), we ﬁnd that player B is signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to defect the more people she observes not
reciprocating.
In each case, the instrument is calculated using information based
on the personal information received by the partners of those who an
individual observes. In columns (1) and (3), the instrument is strong-
ly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage regression. The results are presented in
the table in the Appendix.
We ﬁnd that the measure of M1t is signiﬁcant in columns (1) and
(3), indicating strong support for the statement in Hypothesis 1.
Fig. 7. Distribution of moves along twice-repeated trust game (“Info” sessions).
Table 4
Player B, basic relationships.
Round 1 Round 2
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well when using the decreasing semi-circles deﬁnition of observabil-
ity, the results in column (3) are our preferred speciﬁcation. We refer
to this speciﬁcation in the rest of the analysis.
We ﬁnd no evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2. The number of
people sitting behind a given player is included as a measure for being
observed which may proxy for shame or other audience-related emo-
tions. We ﬁnd this insigniﬁcant in explaining player behavior. This
may be because we do not fully take into account observability by
the experimenter in the analysis of shame. We thus do not interpret
too much from the insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on M2t.
We next consider what might explain the positive coefﬁcient on
M1t. First we consider an alternative interpretation of the results.
4.3. An alternate interpretation of the results?
Player B behavior may also be driven by whether or not other
player Bs are trusted. In other words, player B may observe other
player Bs not reciprocating purely because they were never trusted.
This is different than a situation in which player B is trusted and de-
cides to defect. If player B is indeed reacting to this information, the
main story would be one of updating priors about the player A popu-
lation. We believe this story to be unlikely for a few reasons. First,
player B already knows the action that her paired player A took
when she takes her decision. So updating is less relevant in this con-
text, particularly since players knew that they were playing with the
same person in both rounds. Second, even if player B were reacting to
this information, we would expect her to be more likely to defect in
the ﬁrst round in anticipation of her paired player A exiting in the
next round. Given that our main effects are for the second round we
think this is an implausible story. Finally, we ran an auxiliary regres-
sion where we added the proportion of observed player Bs not beingTable 3
Player A, basic relationships.
1 if trust, 0 if exit Round 1 Round 2
Personal information −0.405⁎ 0.034
(0.107) (0.134)
Information −0.123⁎⁎ −0.196⁎⁎⁎
(0.069) (0.084)
A sent in round 1 0.279⁎
(0.105)
B defected in round 1 −0.396⁎
(0.092)
Constant 0.904⁎ 0.607⁎
(0.040) (0.104)
Observations 140 140
R2 0.174 0.181
Standard errors in parentheses.
⁎ pb0.1.
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.trusted to our estimates from column (3) of Table 5. We used the
same deﬁnition of observability. Results are shown in Table 6 and
show that the proportion of player Bs not being trusted has no direct
effect on defecting behavior.
4.4. Testing for learning or imitation
A participant might be inﬂuenced by what other players in the
session are doing if she is learning about a social norm, does not un-
derstand the game, or lacks the ability to decide on her own. In this
case, a participant may choose to imitate the behavior of others as-
suming that this is indeed optimal behavior for the novel situation
with which she is presented. We attempt to proxy the lack of ability
to decide with education, age, and mother's native language. If the
imitation hypothesis is right, we would expect that the inﬂuence of
other participants will be less for players with higher ability (more
educated, younger, or with Spanish-speaking mothers, since the ex-
periment was conducted in Spanish).
Table 7 shows the results for these tests. We interact the decreas-
ing semi-circles measure with years of schooling in the ﬁrst column,
with age (in years) in the second column, and with having a Quechua
mother in the third column. Observed behaviour does not appear to
have a greater impact for those with less education, those who are
older, or those with a Quechua mother. This suggests that imitation
does not have a stronger effect for those who we might expect to be1 if defect, Same First Decr. Same First Decr.
0 if reciprocate
row & in
front
semi-
circle
semi-
circles
row & in
front
semi-
circle
semi-
circles
Observed non-
reciproc. (M1it)
0.001
(0.028)
0.083⁎
(0.040)
0.052
(0.033)
0.604⁎⁎
(0.120)
0.314⁎
(0.137)
0.504⁎⁎
(0.132)
Bs not seen
(M2it)
−0.001
(0.015)
0.004
(0.012)
0.005
(0.012)
−0.006
(0.009)
−0.006
(0.010)
−0.006
(0.009)
A sent in round 1 −0.167 −0.186⁎ −0.182⁎
(0.088) (0.086) (0.084)
B chose to defect
in round 1
0.372⁎⁎⁎
(0.129)
0.364⁎⁎⁎
(0.113)
0.359⁎⁎⁎
(0.109)
Rooms in house 0.019 −0.003
(0.030) (0.018)
Lent money
often
−0.131⁎
(0.056)
0.019
(0.097)
Constant 0.232 0.125 0.126 0.233 0.374⁎⁎⁎ 0.284⁎
(0.227) (0.095) (0.109) (0.185) (0.151) (0.145)
Observations 113 113 113 94 94 94
R2 0.026 0.034 0.019 0.201 0.143 0.181
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustering at the session level).
⁎ pb0.1
⁎⁎ pb0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.05.
15 In round 1, the dictator game results did not have any explanatory power, either
when entered directly or interacted with the proportion of people sending.
16 Again, a similar exercise for round 1 behavior yielded no signiﬁcant results, OLS or
IV, and these results are omitted to save space.
Table 7
Testing the imitation hypothesis (IV results).
1 if defect,
0 if reciprocate (1) (2) (3)
Observed non-reciproc. (M1it)b −0.345 −2.282 1.190⁎
(1.591) (3.711) (0.506)
Observed non-reciproc.
(M1it)b×Schooling
0.212
(0.325)
Schooling −0.259
(0.208)
Observed non-reciproc.
(M1it)b×Age
0.074
(0.098)
Age −0.026
(0.040)
Observed non-reciproc.
(M1it)b×Quechua
mother
−1.403
(0.741)
Quechua mother 0.575
(0.415)
Bs not seen (M2it) −0.013 0.011 −0.003
(0.007) (0.020) (0.007)
A sent in round 1 −0.262⁎⁎ −0.262⁎ −0.142
(0.091) (0.123) (0.083)
B chose to defect in round 1 0.304⁎⁎ 0.483⁎⁎⁎ 0.331⁎⁎
(0.120) (0.103) (0.115)
Constant 1.601 1.185 −0.088
(1.123) (1.522) (0.332)
Observations 94 94 94
R2 0.216 0.054
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustering at the session level).
bDecreasing semi-circles measure.
⁎ pb0.1.
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.
Table 5
Player B, basic relationships (IV results)a.
Same First Decr.
1 if defect, row & in semi- semi-
0 if reciprocate
front circle circles
Observed non-reciproc. (M1it) 0.693⁎ 0.864 0.678⁎⁎
(0.140) (0.797) (0.226)
Bs not seen (M2it) −0.006 −0.001 −0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
A sent in round 1 −0.164 −0.190⁎⁎ −0.181⁎⁎⁎
(0.090) (0.055) (0.079)
B chose to defect in round 1 0.371⁎⁎ 0.324⁎⁎⁎ 0.349⁎⁎
(0.129) (0.146) (0.112)
Rooms in house −0.003
(0.019)
Lent money often 0.027
(0.102)
Constant 0.184 0.096 0.199
(0.228) (0.433) (0.190)
Observations 94 94 94
R2 0.199 0.170
aRobust standard errors in parentheses (clustering at the session level).
⁎ pb0.01.
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.1.
Table 6
Testing the updating prior hypothesis (IV results).
1 if defect, 0 if reciprocate Round 1 Round 2
Observed non-reciproc.(M1it)a −0.045 0.942⁎
(0.109) (0.451)
Proportion of Bs not trusteda −0.261 −0.626
(0.365) (0.501)
Bs not seen (M2it) −0.005 0.011
(0.031) (0.014)
A sent in round 1 −0.157
(0.096)
B chose to defect in round 1 0.332⁎⁎
(0.122)
Constant 0.237 −0.340
(0.555) (0.582)
Observations 113 94
R2 0.196
Robust standard errors inparentheses (clusteringat the session level). ∗∗ ∗pb0.01, ∗ ∗pb0.05,
∗ pb0.1. a This proportion uses the decreasing semi-circles deﬁnition of observability.
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for Hypothesis 1a, which posits that it was learning about a social
norm or learning how to play the game that explains why M1t has
an inﬂuence on behaviour.
4.5. Does observed behavior increase or decrease reciprocity?
We next explore whether observed behavior encourages individ-
uals to conform or deviate from their previously disclosed preference
for reciprocating. One way to test this idea is to ﬁnd a proxy for what
the individual would do in the absence of the group. We can think of
this as a measure of the participant's true choice or raw preference for
altruism or equality. However, when the participant has to choose in
a group setting, she might prefer to conform or deviate from this pref-
erence, dependent on what she observes others doing.
As a proxy for what the individual might do in the absence of the
group, we use a preference for equality that was expressed in the
choices made in the DG prior to participating in the TG or MTG. As
discussed above, it is quite likely that individuals did not feel they
were playing a pure dictator game, but perhaps felt that they wereplaying some form of a trust game with us the experimenters. As
such, we cannot assume that the DG results are a true measure of
an individual's innate preference for reciprocity. Bearing this in
mind, we use these results as a measure of behavior absent observing
others, and compare the effect of observing others with those who
responded that they would keep or send in the DG.
In Table 8, we test the effect of the dictator game results and its in-
teraction with the decreasing semi-circle measure for M1t. We ﬁnd
that the proportion not reciprocating matters for those who sent in
the dictator game, while non-senders (in the DG) are unaffected.
This is only true for round 2 behavior.15
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 8, we analyze a new dependent
variable, diverge. Diverge takes the value 1 if the player responded
that they would send in the DG but kept in the TG/MTG or if they
responded that they would keep in the DG but sent in the TG/MTG.
Diverge takes the value 0 otherwise. This is regressed on M1t and
the usual set of controls. Column (2) presents results for all player
Bs, whilst column (3) only includes those that chose to send in the
DG. We cannot run a regression for those who chose to keep in the
DG due to insufﬁcient observations. The results show that for those
participants who claim they would send in the dictator game, the
probability of diverging increases as more people around them do
not reciprocate (the coefﬁcient for the semi-circle measure is only
statistically signiﬁcant in the OLS estimation, but not in the IV results
shown in the table). This is consistent with the result that, in the sec-
ond round, player B is more likely to diverge from her DG response
when she observes others not reciprocating.16
1st Stage results for Table 5.
Dependent variable Observed non-reciproc. (M1it)
Same First Decr.
row & in front semi- circle semi- circles
Information treatment (Iit) 1.107∗ ∗ ∗ 0.167 0.868∗ ∗ ∗
(0.208) (0.110) (0.199)
Bs not seen −0.007 −0.019∗ ∗ −0.007
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
A sent in round 1 −0.024 0.025 0.001
(0.072) (0.129) (0.081)
B chose to defect in round 1 0.080 0.096 0.112
(0.074) (0.129) (0.082)
Rooms in house 0.005
(0.015)
Lent money often −0.044
(0.053)
Constant 0.426∗ ∗ ∗ 0.807∗ ∗ ∗ 0.417∗ ∗ ∗
(0.103) (0.141) (0.088)
Observations 94 94 94
R2 0.276 0.087 0.192
aStandard errors in parentheses (clustering at the session level). ∗ ∗ ∗ pb0.01, ∗ ∗ pb0.05,
∗ px=10.1.
Table 8
Testing the changing preferences hypothesis (IV results).
Dependent variable Defect Diverge Diverge
All All Send
Sample in DG
Observed non-reciproc.
(M1it)a×send in DG
0.684⁎⁎
(0.278)
Observed non-reciproc.
(M1it)a×Keep in DG
4.037
(5.805)
Observed non-reciproc. (M1it)a 0.169 0.780⁎
(0.440) (0.336)
Send in DG 0.916
(1.575)
Bs not seen 0.011 −0.011 −0.009
(0.034) (0.016) (0.014)
A sent in round 1 −0.028 −0.034 −0.219⁎⁎
(0.210) (0.085) (0.082)
B chose to defect in round 1 0.173 −0.023 0.080
(0.133) (0.204) (0.100)
Constant −0.953 0.467 0.221
(1.891) (0.360) (0.277)
Observations 65 65 53
R2 0.023 0.100
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustering at the session level). ∗ ∗ ∗ pb0.01,
∗ ∗ pb0.05, ∗ pb0.1.
aDecreasing semi-circles measure.
161R.V. Hill et al. / Journal of Development Economics 99 (2012) 150–162These results suggest that people who would normally reciprocate
are encouraged not to when they observe others deviating from the
norm of reciprocation.17,18
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we present results from an artefactual ﬁeld experi-
ment conducted in rural Peru that considers how observing deviation
from a norm of reciprocity inﬂuences an individual's decision to re-
ciprocate. Empirically identifying the processes which give rise to a
positive relationship between the propensity of an individual to be-
have in a certain way and the prevalence of that behavior in the
group is difﬁcult (Manski, 2000). Possible explanations include inﬂu-
ence of observed behavior, observed characteristics of group mem-
bers, and common characteristics across individuals. We use
exogenous variation in observed behavior to identify the inﬂuence
of observed behavior on individual decision-making. We ﬁnd that
the probability that an individual will deviate from a norm of reci-
procity increases with the number of others observed to deviate.
Our evidence suggests that this arises as a result of preference inter-
actions between group members: as more group members are ob-
served to deviate, the cost of deviation for any individual falls,
resulting in a higher propensity to deviate.
We also used random variation in the position of group members
to assess how being observed affects behavior. We did not ﬁnd that
individuals who were more likely to be observed were less likely to
reciprocate once we had controlled for what the individual observed.
In documenting whether an external shock to the number ob-
served not to reciprocate encourages others to deviate, the paper en-
deavors to provide some insight into how a norm of reciprocity can17 Given the small numbers, it is hard to tell what the impact of group behavior is on
those who would normally keep.
18 If those who state that they are more trusting are simply more naive than others,
then we could be picking up learning effects. If this is the case, some of the hypothe-
sized relationships between behavior and education and ethnicity tested in the previ-
ous section may be more likely to be present within this group. We tested this by
repeating the regressions of the previous section on the sub-sample of households
who said they would reciprocate in the dictator game (results are available from au-
thors on request). Again, education and ethnicity remained insigniﬁcant.develop or unravel when individuals are observing each other's be-
havior, as may be the case in a new market institution. Further anal-
ysis on how behavior is inﬂuenced by the relationship between
those who were observing and those who were observed to deviate
would be a nice extension to this analysis.
Our results suggest there may be a beneﬁt to rewarding reciproc-
ity in institutional arrangements in which reciprocity has a personal
cost. In particular, the ﬁndings suggest that investments that encour-
age reciprocity, perhaps particularly as a new institution develops,
could engender substantial returns for market development. The re-
sults may thus provide a rationale for costly investments in weekly
meetings to encourage reciprocity in newly developed microﬁnance
institutions, as is discussed in Feigenberg et al. (2010). Understanding
how to do this in other settings merits analysis in further policy re-
search work. The more difﬁcult question becomes how to design pol-
icies and institutions that encourage an individual's intrinsic
motivation to reciprocate in the absence of material incentives to do
so (Bohnet and Baytelman, 2007).Acknowledgments
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